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Abstract:
This paper is but one part of a broader study that examines 
the gender-speciic posiion of contemporary death and of 
suicide in paricular. As a point of departure, it takes a set 
of arguments around discourses on suicide as hegemonic, 
accumulated around the sovereign domain of medical and 
scieniic knowledge and in charge of a compulsory ontology 
of suicide. I understand this situaion, together with Katrina 
Jaworski and Ian Marsh, in the irst place to be highly 
problemaic and lacking construcive counter-proposals. A 
major task to be undertaken is twofold: irst, to scruinize the 
centre of the hegemonic (clinical) episteme by penetraing 
its dynamics of power; then, to ofer alternaives to its 
‘regimes of truth’ within the plurality of epistemic models, 
approaches, and raionaliies. To underline the extent to 
which the gendering process occurs therein is tantamount 
to this task. Accordingly, I want to argue that the dominant 
ontology and epistemology of suicide produce a discursively 
polluted and clouded backdrop where pathological and 
patriarchal principles sill prevail. This paper thus aims at 
interrogaing suicidology further, across its canonic strands 
of thought and poliics of representaion. Moreover, it will 
introduce some unexplored dissident perspecives into an 
existent counter-hegemonic agenda for an overall liberaion 
from Western scieniic epistemicide – the gendering of 
suicide being no excepion to that. 
Key words: suicide, gender, representaion, epistemicide, 
necropoliics
Introducion
What is suggested here is not in any way an alternaive theory 
of suicide, or even that such a thing would be desirable, but 
rather that through a sort of realignment, a change in our line 
of sight, it may be possible to ‘make visible’ that which has, 
over ime, slipped from view.
Ian Marsh1
The quesion of suicide is not and has never been singular. Rather it is the mater of an ongoing hermeneuic 
inconsistency. This paper2 takes seriously into account such inconsistency and the evidence that the meanings of suicide 
“are so protean across ime and space that it is not so clear that there is one thing, suicide.”3 Scholars, present and 
1
 Ian Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, History & Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75.
2 This paper relates to my PhD research project Suicide Cultures. Theories and Pracices or Radical Withdrawal – A Transnaional Cultural 
and Media Paradigm (2001–2011). Started in 2011 at the Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, University of Ghent (Belgium), it 
is supervised by Prof. Dr. Tom Claes, Director of CEVI – the Center for Ethics and Value Inquiry, and supported by Basileus Scholarship – an 
Erasmus Mundus Acion 2 project for academic exchange between the EU and the Western Balkans funded by the European Commission.
3 Ian Hacking, “The Suicide Weapon,” Criical Inquiry 35, 1 (2008), 1.
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future, should never overlook the fact that suicide resides in the space of discursive plurality. This is one of the reasons 
why their analyical approaches should always preferably aim toward resolving the quesions of suicides (both plural) 
instead of iing any existent normaive framework. In what follows, I am ofering but a modest atempt at addressing 
the versaile interpretaions around this troublesome phenomenon with one paricular focus in mind: the gendered 
posiion of suicide and its (un)representability in the epistemic hierarchy of scieniic and popular discourses. Hence, I 
will centre on the problem of knowledge on suicide and related issues, most notably as gender-speciic. While sufering 
from Western scieniic epistemicide, they will be treated as the vicims of patriarchal and scieniic demagogies in 
which the clinical episteme has a privileged power posiion.
The Compulsory Ontology and Clinical Episteme of Suicide 
The producion and distribuion of knowledge on suicide have been the privilege of power discourses pertaining to 
healthcare experise in medical sciences and clinical pracice, as discussed by Ian Marsh.4 Accordingly, the subject 
has been treated as part of a broader ield of knowledge where abnormality, mental disease, psychological disorder, 
and pathological behaviour play the most disincive roles. Such dominant viewpoints have, in turn, also produced a 
boomerang efect. By poining out the relaive validity of normaive and hegemonic discourses themselves (or “the 
ways in which contemporary approaches to suicide could be said to relate to the prevenion of suicide, and sufering 
in relaion to suicide”),5 many professionals have challenged the power posiions in the study ield. Their need to 
quesion the ruling system of knowledge has not emerged from the compeiive atmosphere of revolt for the sake of 
mere criicality. On the contrary, it has evolved from equally strong arguments in discursive analyses producing a kind 
of situated, ‘revoluionary’ dissidence. One of their aims is to set the study ield free from the so-called “egopoliics of 
knowledge,” about which Grosfoguel and Mielants write the following lines:
Occidentalism created the epistemic privilege and hegemonic idenity poliics of the West 
from which to judge and produce knowledge about the ‘Others.’ The egopoliics of knowledge 
of Rene Descartes in the 17th century where Western men replace God as the foundaion 
of knowledge is the foundaional basis of modern Western philosophy. However as Enrique 
Dussel (1994), Lain American philosopher of liberaion, reminds us, Descartes’ ego-cogito (‘I 
think, therefore I am’) was preceded by 150 years of the ego-conquirus (‘I conquer, therefore 
I am’). The God-eye view defended by Descartes transferred the atributes of the Chrisian God 
to Western men (the gender here is not accidental). But this was only possible from an Imperial 
Being, that is, from the panopic gaze of someone who is at the centre of the world because he 
has conquered it.6 
Through what could be termed the violent invasion of scieniic epistemology, I comply with the dissidents by arguing 
that the omnipresent normaive perspecives have reached the point of theoreical, insituional, and poliical 
colonizaion. More than one knowledge discipline, where suicide has found ferile grounds to be analyzed and 
discussed criically, make up part of the cogniive and empirical territory from which to launch criical arguments 
against the imperial ‘regime of truth’ and to open up possibiliies for epistemic liberaion. Therefore, when it comes 
to ‘a quesion of suicide’ one needs to account for the epistemic plurality of related and unrelated arguments within 
the hierarchy of power structures around suicidality. Given the leading posiions in such a hierarchy, reserved since the 
nineteenth century for pathologizing, prevenive, patriarchal, and patronizing perspecives, they have also established 
the principles for an obligatory ontology of suicide. I treat it as the kind of sovereignty where medical discourses and 
clinical pracices have deinitely prevailed. However, my stance is that one should never dismiss the coexistence of the 
plurality of other (ethical, theoreical, and scieniic) arguments proposed throughout recent history and across the 
world. In such a universe of counter-arguments this paper found its point of departure. Marsh, for example, uses the 
term ‘compulsory ontology’ when he describes this “necessity of expert knowledge at the expense of other ways of 
understanding [as] a compulsory ontology di cult to criique.”7 In problemaizing contemporary discursive formaions 
of suicide and, more precisely, a contemporary ‘regime of truth’ in relaion to it, he says the following: 
Within the ield that has come to be known as ‘suicidology,’ suicide itself is consituted as an 
object of scieniic study, as are suicidal paients. Epidemiological studies seek to establish the 
4
 Marsh,  Suicide: Foucault, History & Truth, 2010.5 Ibid., 66 – 67. 6 Ramón Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, “The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/
Patriarchal World-System. An Introducion,” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-knowledge 1 (2006), 8 (M.S. emphasis).7
 Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, History & Truth, 66.
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truth of suicide in terms of quaniiable factors such as age, sex, and means while psychological 
autopsy studies have sought to correlate acts of self-destrucion with categories of mental 
illness. More recently, studies into the biology and geneics of suicide risk have looked to ind 
evidence of neuro-chemical, neuro-anatomical or geneic abnormaliies that could explain why 
people kill themselves. It is the meeing of science and medicine that dominates the ield of 
suicide studies.8
Staring from this controversial meeing-point between science and medicine, Marsh coninues his ‘guided-tour’ 
around the ‘exhibiion of power structures’ in suicidology. In his words, as regards the mater of pracice, atenion 
should equally be paid to the following:
In pracice too, for the most part those considered expert on suicide and the management of suicidal people are 
doctors, paricularly psychiatrists. Other professions – psychology, social work, nursing, occupaional therapy – tend 
to work within a medically delineated, and to a large extent controlled, space. Through this meeing of scieniic 
study and medical/psychiatric pracice the truths of suicide have come to be (and coninue to be) formed. Such ways 
of thinking and acing come together to produce and reproduce a form of suicide that could be characterized as 
individual, pathological and medical. Suicide is taken as arising as a consequence of mental illness, a form of pathology 
or abnormality situated within the individual, and it is thus a mater of medical/psychiatric concern. It is now di cult 
to talk of suicide without recourse to some noion of mental illness, usually depression, or reference to the ‘mental 
state’ of the person involved.9
Evidently, Marsh argues that “suicide is constructed within dominant discourses as a unitary act with a singular meaning 
– pathology.”10 Thus, its abnormality remains situated within the individual (the ‘unitary,’ and not the social). This 
discloses the general condiions within which any alternaive, counter-hegemonic epistemology, including sociology 
and social philosophy, encounters obstacles and di culies in coping with the ‘condemnaion imperaive’11 of power 
discourses – or their ‘compulsory ontology,’ as Marsh calls it, and coninues:
What such a stance makes di cult is the development of other ways of consituing suicide and 
the formaion of alternaive objects, concepts and subjeciviies in relaion to self-accomplished 
death. Instead there is a coninual reproducion of suicide as the tragic act of a mentally unwell 
individual. As this is taken to be necessary, real and true – described here in terms of a compulsory 
ontology – it becomes di cult to criique, and shortcomings and negaive (even if unintended) 
consequences that follow from so consituing suicide are for the most part unexplored.12
While remaining fully supporive of Marsh’s worthwhile stance on the issue at hand, this paper complies with his ‘de-
colonial’ atempts toward the liberaion of suicide from its singular and compulsory ontology. Yet beside the plurality 
to be fought for, widely recognized and applied, there is one – inevitably singular – aspect of suicide(s) that should 
not be overlooked: its enigmaic, undeinable, and, for the ime being, unanswerable nature. Independently from 
any poliical, social, cultural, and ethical contexts within which suicides are discussed, ideated, or commited, the 
singularity of our knowledge (or, rather, ignorance) about suicide and its ‘doubles’ remains hermeneuically incomplete. 
This incompleteness should not be a reason to stop thinking and looking further than the limited distances imposed 
by a ‘compulsory ontology.’ On the contrary, these should be transgressed and expanded. The gendered dimensions of 
suicide are but a way to be engaged in such task.
Is Death a woman?
Suicide, Gendering and Dissidence
Marsh exposes a larger picture of “a criical inquiry into the formaion of suicide as pathological and medical.”13 The 
gendering (and queering) of suicide has its own place in it. To suggest one example, I will give a hint on this problemaic 
8
 Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, History & Truth, 65.9 Ibid., 65.
10 Ibid., 66.
11 Ghassan Hage, “‘Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm.’ Understanding Palesinian Suicide Bombers in Times of Exhighophobia,” Public 
Culture 15, 1 (2003), 67.
12




IDENTITIES journal for poliics, gender and culture
IDENTITIES vol. 10 / no. 1-2
as ariculated in his recent study.14 When he analyses “the ways the ‘suicidal homosexual’ was consituted in psychiatric 
discourse,” he remarks: “Although at imes rather ill-deined – appearing only in the margins or at the periphery of 
psychiatric thought – such a igure was most oten portrayed as ‘weak yet destrucive,’ with the psychiatric profession 
wavering between pity and condemnaion.”15 
Says Marsh: 
Declared a pathological ‘type’ in the late nineteenth century, the ‘homosexual’ came to be 
consituted in relaion to a variety of psychiatric theories and pracices over the next century. 
Iniially formed as ‘degenerates,’ ‘perverts,’ and ‘inverts,’ later as emoionally immature, 
disordered personaliies, most usually understood as in some way biologically abnormal, 
psychiatric descripions of the ‘homosexual’ also came to include consideraion of their perceived 
propensity to self-destrucion.16
Here, again, a few things become more than evident, namely: that the psychiatric matrix of power discourses 
is discriminatory; that it has pretensions towards universalist and patriarchal ‘truths’; and that it exposes itself as 
troublesome in relaion to a queer paradigm when claiming the igure of ‘suicidal homosexual’ (or, for that mater, 
‘suicidal prositute,’ ‘suicidal [poor unmarried] woman,’ and so on) to be problemaic, i.e. pathological. Therefore, in the 
current process of epistemic decolonizaion it is the contemporary ‘regime of truth’ in relaion to suicide that turns out 
to be itself the point of controversy, as Marsh contends. I will treat the abovemenioned ‘deviaions’ from a gendered 
norm as a family of issues awaiing to be liberated from psychiatric ‘compulsory ontology’ and epistemic violence. 
At this point, what interest me most are their visual properies: the ways they have co-existed (as representaions of 
suicidal deaths) in modern and contemporary imaginaries in relaion to gender. 
So, is Death a woman?
For Karl S. Guthke this quesion was a staring-point in his iconographic inquiry of Western representaions of death 
and its gendering, in paricular through the igure of death.17 His main dilemma revolves around the raionality behind 
a range of choices, namely, “why is it that in some cultures and imes, literature, folklore, and art commonly represent 
death as a man, in others as a woman?”18 Guthke’s dealing with this issue transcends any arbitrariness. He scruinizes 
it as a mater of situated, contextualized, and strategic choice. In a historical overview spanning the period since 
the middle Ages unil the late twenieth century, he discloses a variety of aitudes and understandings of death. He 
perceives them as a number of possible ways to give meaning to the world and to humanity at large. This is most notably 
valid for what concerns “the cultural history of the West.”19 He acknowledges “the wealth of images that the creaive 
impulse has produced over hundreds of years of imagining the unimaginable in the Western world,” while being aware 
that “such images may or may not reveal something about the ‘nature’ of death.”20 Instead, he coninues, “they open 
our eyes for aspects of ‘the world as interpretaion,’ that is, for humans, individuals and groups, oriening themselves 
in their world by making such images and thereby, ulimately, deining themselves.”21 A certain type of power dynamics 
must have resided in those choices turning the igure of death recognizable either as a man or a woman: “At any given 
ime, related and contrary images of death naturally cluster around the dominant ones. Diferent cultural contexts, 
difering group-speciic views as well as diferent individual aitudes create diferent images of death. They are male 
and female images that each comprises a wide variety of further difereniaions: old and young, beauiful and ugly, 
fatherly and motherly, terrifying and seducive, contempible and venerable, and so on.”22
14 Ian Marsh, “Queering Suicide: The Problemaic Figure of the ‘Suicidal Homosexual’ in Psychiatric Discourse,” in Queering Paradigms, ed. 
Burkhard Scherer (New York: Peter Lang Press, 2010), 141-159. 
15
 Ibid., 141. 16
 Ibid., 141.17
 Guthke, Karl S. The Gender of Death. A Cultural History in Art and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1999. The German 
ediion of this book was published a year earlier: Guthke, Karl S. Ist der Tod eine Frau? Geschlecht und Tod in Kunst und Literatur (München: 
C.H.Beck Verlag), 1998.
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I want to expose a set of remarks that criically embrace the binaries proposed by Guthke, such as man/woman, 
male/female, life/death, image/word, igure/abstracion, and seeing/interpreing. This preliminary step is signiicant 
inasmuch as it paves the way toward a more nuanced comprehension of gender-related aspects of suicidal death. I 
understand such death as a speciic way of dying turned into a theoreical concept, philosophical issue, and cultural 
phenomenon. Its materializaion in textual and visual terms (i.e. cultural products) imposes one more argument to be 
addressed as relevant concerning those aspects of analysis that keep being omited from dominant perspecives. As 
Marsh argues: 
Thought of in this way – that is suicide and the suicidal as cultural products – self-accomplished 
deaths can come to be read less as statements concerning the internal, mental state of isolated 
individuals, but rather as outcomes of a play of culturally situated, relaionally unequal forces. 
Issues of social jusice, of fairness, the means by which certain groups come to be marginalized 
and viliied within a culture can come to the fore in discussions of the reasons why a person 
may have ended their life. Rather than suicide being interpreted either as an unreasonable, 
irraional act, determined by illness, or a raional course of acion freely chosen, it could perhaps 
be understood as a product of cultural forces situated outside the individual. Such forces could 
be understood as consituing the suicidal individual, and even of forming, over ime, the act 
itself.23
Guthke’s quesion (Is Death a woman?) implies a complex chain of relaions from the outset. First, it implies that 
there is a link between the noion of death and the noion of a woman, even if this does not necessarily result in their 
equaion. Second, it implies that the noion of death demands a certain kind of iguraion (instead of abstracion), a 
personiicaion or embodiment of an idea. Third, it implies that such an idea, turned into a body through personiicaion, 
depends on gendered choices between a man and a woman. These choices allow for possible reversals (Death is a man 
or a woman) yet without alternaives (Death is either a man or a woman). Fourth, it implies that the quesion (Is Death 
a woman?) rests upon a doubt, while it also invokes thinking in the opposite direcion: if Death is a woman, is Life a 
man? This switch is acceptable only under condiions whereby there are clear division lines between a ‘woman’ and 
a ‘man’ inasmuch as between ‘Death’ and ‘Life.’ Fith: if Death is indeed a woman and, conversely, Life is a man, what 
does this process of iconographic segregaion tell us about the gendered matrix of power through the language of life/
death relaionships? How is such a matrix constructed in the cultural history of the West and what are its limits in “the 
world as interpretaion” as Guthke earlier contended? What does ‘Life-as-Man’ exclude from interpretaion and which 
role does ‘Death-as-Woman’ play in the gendered matrix of power? If they are supposed to remain separated, is this 
in order to perpetuate some already established understandings of our world and deiniions of ourselves, in Guthke’s 
line of thought? Moreover, are human beings condemned to exist within some strict knowledge framework that has 
already been set up (by images of death, among other construcions) so as to orient themselves in the world? Why did 
the cultural history of the West need to represent Death at all and, further on, to have the idea of Death personiied 
and anthropomorphized? Finally, how to exercise control over life and death if they have no body? Criical strands in 
sociology and social philosophy may suggest some helpful insights in tracing the answers to these quesions.
Numerous contemporary studies have been treaing the social paterns of suicidality in relaion to (or, rather, in contrast 
to) dominaing macro-sociological perspecives. This criicism is further enhanced by the fact that general atenion to 
suicide, and consequently knowledge on suicide, appeared only throughout the nineteenth century. Due to “the newly 
iniiated mortality staisics… it was generally suspected that the drasic social changes associated with the processes 
of industrializaion and urbanizaion were somehow related to the rising suicide rate.”24 What interest me at this point 
are not the staisical and historical evidences around the socially implicated increase of self-inlicted death. Rather, it is 
an idea that countability has been inseparable from modes of governance over death through staisical measures and 
modernizaion processes. Some recent studies, in which suicide emerges primarily as a technology of governance, are 
of valuable support towards this idea. The sociologist Thomas F. Tierney, for example, focuses his analysis on the issue 
of governance and the governmentality of suicide.25 Following Michel Foucault’s  preliminary remarks on bio-power 
in his History of Sexuality (1976), Tierney traces “the relaionship between the sociological appropriaion of suicide 
and this uniquely modern form of power.”26 He does so by interpreing Jacques Peuchet in relaion to the views of Karl 
Marx and Émile Durkheim on the subject, while taking their “two nineteenth-century sociological treaises on suicide 
23
 Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, History & Truth, 74.
24 Ilkka Henrik Mäkinen and Tanya Jukkala, “Suicide in Changing Socieies,” in Balic Worlds 3(1), 2010, 10.25 Thomas F. Tierney, “The Governmentality of Suicide: Peuchet, Marx, Durkheim, and Foucault,” Journal of Classical Sociology 10, 4 (2010), 
357–389. See also Thomas F. Tierney, “Anatomy and Governmentality: A Foucauldian Perspecive on Death and Medicine in Modernity,” Theory 
& Event 2, 1 (1998), 1–50.26 Ibid., 357.
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as historical examples of the development of ‘governmentality.’”27
It is worth remembering that the nineteenth century was a historical epoch that ‘gave birth’ to insituionalized scieniic 
studies of suicide, most notably thanks to the eforts of the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). For beter 
or worse, Durkheim sill stands out among many of his predecessors who have remained either excluded from our 
knowledge of suicide studies or have turned out to be less recognizable in the public domains concerned with those 
studies.28 Durkheim’s professional aitude toward women, negaively biased when it comes to his over-discussed book 
Suicide. A Study in Sociology,29 deserves special atenion. This is even more necessary when compared with another, 
easily forgoten study worthy of noice. I am referring, of course, to Jacques Peuchet and his Memoirs.30 Peuchet 
(1758–1830) was “a leading French police administrator, economist, and staisician”31 whose Memoirs from the Police 
Archives, published posthumously in 1838, also contained his commentary on suicides in early nineteenth-century 
Paris. This commentary served as a staring point for Karl Marx (1818–1883) to tackle the issue of suicide briely in 
his own work. The issue surprisingly remained scarce in his own wriings: “It is Marx’s only published discussion of 
suicide. Ater he published this brief aricle in 1846 in Gesellschatsspiegel (Mirror of Society), a small German socialist 
journal in which Engels was involved, he never returned to the topic.”32 As sociologist Kevin Anderson highlighted on 
the occasion of the irst English ediion of Memoirs, “it is not, properly speaking, an aricle by Marx [as] it consists of 
Marx’s brief four-paragraph introducion, followed by his edited translaion of [Peuchet’s] lengthy excerpts.”33 In the 
context of my paper, this work is signiicant because it “contains one of the most sustained discussions of gender in 
Marx’s early wriings, [namely] the suicide of women, linking these events to women’s oppression inside the French 
bourgeois family.”34 In Marx’s ediion, Peuchet’s opening words straighforwardly target the causality of high annual 
suicide rates. He is atacking the social rather than the individual raionality behind it, viewing it “as a symptom of 
the deicient organizaion of our society.”35 Addiionally, he refers to “…no society, but, as Rousseau said, a desert 
populated by wild animals.”36 
The noion of family is of fundamental importance at this point. Here it is seen as a social category of micro-power 
relaions. It difers from the category of single, unmarried, lower-class, unemployed women: the most common 
category of female suicides at the ime. This is precisely the point of contestaion where Peuchet (as remarked by 
Anderson 1999, 13) diagnoses the persistence of that kind of organizaional deiciency within which suicidal ideaions 
coninue to grow: “The revoluion did not topple all tyrannies. The evil which one blames on arbitrary forces exists in 
families, where it causes crises, analogous to those of revoluions.”37 This analogy (between families and revoluions, 
between tyrannies and families, and between their respecive causaliies of crises) is a turning point from which to 
place the noion of gender in relaion to Marx’s view on suicide. Says Anderson: 
Marx suggests that the oppressiveness of the bourgeois family is responsible for many cases 
of female suicide, especially of young women [and] also helps us to grasp more clearly his 
emerging views on gender and the family in modern society, during the same period in which he 
was developing his concepts of alienated labour and historical materialism and the beginnings 
of his criique of poliical economy and the state.38 
27 See Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Anthropology of the State. A Reader, Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, eds. (Malden, MA 
and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 131-143; Jonathan Xavier Inda, ed. Anthropologies of Modernity. Foucault, Governmentality, and Life 
Poliics (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 2006. Also: Majia Holmer Nadesan, Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life ( 
New York and London: Routledge), 2008.
28 Robert D. Goldney, Johan A. Schioldann, and Kirsten I. Dunn, “Suicide Research Before Durkheim,” Health & History 10, 2 (2008), 73-93. Also: 
Maria Teresa Brancaccio, Eric J. Engstrom and David Lederer, “The Poliics of Suicide: Historical Perspecives on Suicidology before Durkheim. 
An Introducion,” Journal of Social History 3 (2013), 607-619.29 See Durkheim, Émile. Suicide. A Study in Sociology (New York: Simon and Schuster), 2010.
30 Marx, Karl. “Peuchet on Suicide.” In Marx on Suicide, edited by Eric A. Plaut and Kevin Anderson, translated by Gabrielle Edgcomb (Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press), 1999, 43-75. Originally published in Karl Marx, “Peuchet: vom Selbstmord” (Gesellschatspiegel, zweiter 
Band, Het VII, Elberfeld),  Januar 1846.
31 Eric A. Plaut and Kevin Anderson, eds., Gabrielle Edgcomb, trans., Marx on Suicide (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press), 1999, 
3.
32 Kevin Anderson, “Marx on Suicide in the Context of His Other Wriings on Alienaion and Gender,” in Marx on Suicide, Eric A. Plaut and Kevin 




 Ibid., 3. 35 Marx, “Peuchet on Suicide,” 47.36 Ibid., 50.37 Ibid., 50–51.
38 Anderson, “Marx on Suicide in the Context of His Other Wriings on Alienaion and Gender,” 22.
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But what do the elements of this new constellaion have to do with each other when perceived all together (the state, 
poliical economy, historical materialism, alienated labour, family, gender, and – suicide)? Does it seem to be but an 
arbitrary proliferaion of  terms, noions, and concepts? Have they remained ixed exclusively to ime and space (the 
Western world of the post-Enlightenment era) in which both Marx and Durkheim developed their respecive theories 
of society, poliics, and culture?
“Certain similariies between the treatment of suicide by Marx and that by Durkheim […], more in social than in 
psychological terms” give evidence that “both view suicide as symptomaic of broader social ills, and both are interested 
in empirical data on suicide rather than moral or philosophical speculaion.”39 Nonetheless, as Anderson points out, 
“it is on [the] issue of limiing divorce that Marx’s diferences with Durkheim would seem to become the sharpest, 
given Marx’s stress on oppressive family relaionships as a major factor in female suicide, and his criique of bourgeois 
marriage as an oppressive insituion that should not be regarded as a ixed universal.”40 Comparaively, what remains 
interesing concerning Durkheim’s professional relaion to women (and thus his category of female suicides) is criically 
accentuated by Anderson: “At several points in Suicide, Durkheim makes extremely disparaging comments about 
women, wriing at one point that women’s ‘mental life is less developed’ than men’s because ‘women’s needs are 
more closely related to the organism’[… ] No comparable statements can be found in Marx’s work.”41 Durkheim also 
understands marriage (and, accordingly, divorce) very diferently from Marx, arguing for the strengthening of marriage 
instead of liberalizing divorce. 
Says Anderson:
Because divorce or ‘conjugal anomie’ is a major form of anomie, which is itself a major cause 
of male suicide, he recommends making ‘marriage more indissoluble.’ Durkheim acknowledges 
[and this is the most upseing comment in my view, M. S.] ‘that the suicides of husbands cannot 
be diminished in this way without increasing those of wives,’ but he seems, however reluctantly, 
to accept this as a necessary evil. He even asks: ‘Must one of the sexes necessarily be sacriiced?’42 
A perverted link in this interdependency between the wife’s slavery and the husband’s slaveholding rights, as Peuchet 
had earlier pronounced it, was “supported by the civil code and the right of property [according to which] she is but a 
part of his inventory.”43 Hence the objecthood of married women used to stand for (and sill oten does) the most ferile 
ground on which the authority of their husbands could be indispensably exercised. Within the domain of sovereignty 
empowered by tacit familial laws of oppression, such exercise was indirectly ‘sancioned’ while occurring inside 
homes and following private ‘laws’ (i.e. outside of public view and legal control). It is in that domain of privacy where 
the neuralgic point of the discussion at hand needs to be diagnosed. The family home, being the site of masculine 
despoism against women (wives, daughters, housemaids), funcions in line with gender-biased micro-governance. It 
also stands for the nodal point around which, in Peuchet’s words, the malign symptoms of the “deicient organizaion 
of our society” converge. If this is the governance typical of family, as Marx understood it, then its own properies of 
micro-power (patriarchal, parochial, chauvinist, male, etc.) are nowadays becoming increasingly visible on a macro-
scale. If Death is a woman, and Life is a man, the old model of oppression sill happens in our global world due to 
(what contemporary criical theory perceives as) neo-liberal sovereignty, namely: the colonial, capitalist, and racial 
paterns of imperial dominaion. This is but one possible answer to my earlier quesion concerning the many points 
of intersecion in the constellaion of power: if there is a name for such constellaion today then it must be that of 
neoliberal ‘biopoliical’ imperial sovereignty.
Juxtaposing masculine governmentality with female subservience, through the lenses of her supposedly natural 
predilecions for ‘mental weaknesses,’ has not come hereby as an arbitrary choice. I treat it as a construcive way of 
dealing with the ongoing matrix of gender-speciic power that can reposiion our general knowledge on suicidality and 
how it works in the world of visual representaions. In that regard, art history gives many illustraive arguments. 
In her recent publicaion, Michelle Facos deals with “the changing relaionship between arists and society since the 
Enlightenment and issues of idenity.”44 Relying upon “a common format for represening female suicide … in both 
39 Anderson, “Marx on Suicide in the Context of His Other Wriings on Alienaion and Gender,” 19–20.
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contemporary literature and illustraion,” Facos stresses the fact that in nineteenth-century England “suicidal women 
frequently were shown casing themselves from windows and bridges into rivers… This penchant for represening 
drowning women relected contemporary reality – drowning was the most common means of suicide for women in the 
nineteenth century; men preferred hanging.”45 In a secion of her book centred on “Female Suicide,” she gives a brief 
and curious background to the issue while discussing the topic of “Realism and the Urban Poor.” What she points out 
is a paradox: the countable facts (disclosing a higher number of male than female suicides in the nineteenth-century) 
stand in opposiion to the cultural proliferaion of female suicides in the related visual representaions of the epoch. 
Says Facos:
The seing for these images was always the city; such despair was speciically associated with 
urban alienaion and desperaion […] In England, although many more men actually commited 
suicide, depicions and descripions of them are rare, while female suicides appeared frequently 
in popular one-shilling books, novels, newspapers, prints, and painings. Bridge-jumping was 
the most commonly represented method of female suicide, despite the fact that most women 
quietly illed their pockets with stones and plunged into a nearby pond or canal.46 
In England at that ime, like elsewhere in the European West, it was apparently not rare to ind many poor single 
women among whom some were doomed to prositute themselves for the sake of mere survival. In the framework as 
suggested by Facos, the general category of the poor was not only considered emoionally or mentally unstable but, 
very oten, was demonized by the ruling (male) part of the society in order to be governed. In that sense, there is a 
quesion sill to be answered: why were male suicides, as she writes, “conspicuously absent from nineteenth-century 
pictorial imagery, although they occurred with three imes greater frequency”?47 Her own response is simple: 
This relected a gap between popular percepions and social realiies. Suicide was considered 
deviant behavior, and men – who did most of the describing and represening – ascribed all 
human weaknesses to women. This perpetrated a false impression that women, especially 
prositutes, had a high suicide rate. Conclusions of ‘scieniic’ psychological studies – discussed 
[by the author herself in the same book, remark by M.S.] in connecion with Géricault’s portraits 
of the insane – jusiied such aitudes.48 
Therefore, males – who were empowered by tacit laws (of oppression) and tools (of image producion) – were the 
ones to materialize suicides into images: by doing most of the describing and represening, as Facos says, they also 
produced a masculinist version of suicidal death through images as cultural products (in Marsh’s terms, quoted earlier). 
The female representability of ‘mental weaknesses’ is hereby traded for male ‘unrepresentability’ – or the absence of 
males in the images produced by them for the sake of  their own gender-safe representability and governmentality 
therein. One may think of more than one reason for such an unfair trade to occur: art historians could probably 
agree that the most evident reasons will remain dependent on the poliics of representaion that has historically 
privileged heroism (and not weakness, mental or otherwise) as the mater of men-centred imagery. Such preference 
was materialized in the prominence of female modes of self-destrucion which, according to Facos, were also modiied, 
constructed, or simply fake. This is evident not only in terms of the frequency or popularizaion (one-shilling books, 
novels, newspapers, prints, and painings), but rather in terms of fabricated and spectacular ‘truths’ about how they 
did it. One may even call this way of self-accomplished death a withdrawal from the world: Facos describes it as 
quietly, silently disappearing into the water. To quietly disappear into the water does not necessarily mean to jump 
from a bridge! The later makes up part of the popular voyeurisic fantasy, on behalf of male image-makers, due to 
their abundance of self-esteem and lack of ethical stance toward women. They obviously wanted to preserve the 
memory of those women (poor, single, unemployed, etc.), yet this occurred in a way that created a gendered patern 
for represening them as ‘drowning women.’ The scopic ‘regime of truth’ thus produced was very diferent from the 
facts. Is this enough to answer my earlier quesion, the one that wraps up the arguments exposed in this paper, how to 
exercise control over life and death if they had no body?
Suicide. London: Reakion Books, 2001.45 Facos, An Introducion to Nineteenth Century Art, 228.46 Ibid., 228 (M.S. emphasis).47 Ibid., 229.
48 Ibid., 229.
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Conclusion
“The quesion of unrepresentability leads directly to the way in which poliical violence may or may not be put into 
an image.”49 If representability and unrepresentability necessarily imply the issue of violence, this paper has been but 
an atempt to ask how Death, Life, Man, and – last but not least – Woman expose themselves together not only to 
poliical violence but to the violent poliics of representaion and its epistemic efects. While being rendered visible, 
embodied and anthropomorphized (through images), female subjects and their male counterparts are thus becoming 
open and exposed to our systems of interpretaion, or hidden for the same reasons. Hence we, the viewing subjects, 
have a possibility of engaging in the producion of discourses and discursive orders of power, or its lack therein. If by 
‘images’ I want to connote the materializaion of what must irrevocably remain hidden or invisible from our view, then 
by ‘poliical violence’ (as a way of conclusion of this paper) I also want to connote something precise that has remained 
forcefully hidden or invisible under neoliberal sovereignty and its ‘biopoliical’ matrix of power. 
‘Biopoliical’ power discourses, centred on the management of life and life-related issues, are also sites of exclusion, 
obscurity, and invisibility. What has remained excluded from their supposedly benevolent, objecive, and life-improving 
concerns, indispensable for the forced logic of neoliberal posiivity thus promoted, is precisely the logic of negaivity 
(pain, sufering, death) within which the majority of world populaions reside. What life-poliics excludes from our 
lives, therefore, are the pracical condiions of mortality, death, and our proximity to death. While defending the idea 
of life, the secret of ‘biopoliical’ power remains obscured, namely, “the right to kill, to allow to live, or to expose to 
death.”50 This is also why so-called biopoliics has been hiding its proper name – necropoliics. For the Cameroonian 
philosopher, Achille Mbembe, necropoliics stands for “the contemporary ways in which the poliical, under the guise 
of war, of resistance, or of the ight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objecive.”51 
This is also the reason why, I keep arguing, the overrepresentaion of female suicidality in nineteenth-century England 
(and elsewhere in the Western world) was the result of a necropoliical, patriarchal, and pathologizing sovereign logic 
of self-defence: a trend that has not been enirely evicted throughout the centuries since. It has certainly remained 
present not only in what concerns the dominant discourses of suicidology (where, among other issues, the gendered 
posiion sill silently dwells), but in whatever concerns our ways of being a ‘contemporary,’ ‘civilized,’ ‘raional,’ and 
‘developed humankind’.
Staring from these lines of thought, preliminary for my future studies around the gender-speciic posiion of 
necropoliics, I want to conclude now my iniial dialogues with Guthke, Facos, Marsh, and Mbembe so that I can go 
further with this analysis, most notably in my upcoming scholarly texts (foreseen to follow the present paper). To go 
further means to go beyond the challenges of already exposed arguments, so that one speciic type of death (suicide) 
and its gendering can be put into focus. In order to accomplish such a task, I will rely upon Katrina Jaworski, the Polish-
Australian social philosopher, whose work so far (collected in The Gender of Suicide. Knowledge Producion, Theory 
and Suicidology. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, upcoming) will ‘serve’ as the major theoreical background for my future 
analysis: not only against the ‘servility’ of suicide studies in general and their gendering in paricular, but against any 
‘servility;’ a struggle against it that Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls ani-imperial epistemologies of the global South.
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